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Separation versus Affiliation with Partial Vertical Ownership 








The separation of integrated monopolies and new market entrants have changed vertical 
interactions between suppliers and dealers. Firms have substituted full integration with 
vertical restraints leading to collusive behaviour harmful to competition. We examine how a 
partial vertical ownership (an affiliation) of one of the competing downstream retailers by the 
upstream monopoly could help internalise the production decision after a complete 
divestiture. Our results in a Cournot framework confirm the positive role of partial integration 
on firms' profits and consumer surplus in increasing social welfare. These results are 
consistent with empirical studies of economies after vertical separation in network industries. 
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Partial ownership (PO) is the acquisition by a company of a fraction of the equity of a 
horizontal competitor or a supplier/manufacturer in a vertical relationship. The acquired 
participation is generally not a majority or controlling stake and, in this case, is a silent 
operation (Reitman, 1994; Bresnahan and Salop, 1986). There are regulatory ownership 
thresholds (typically at the 5%, 10%, 20% and 30% levels) and publicly traded companies are 
required to disclose when they cross these thresholds. For instance, the 2010 US horizontal 
merger guidelines introduce a section on partial acquisitions (Fiocco, 2016).  
The study of partial ownership is crucial because its effects differ from those of majority 
shareholdings and mergers which, in most cases, are identical (Reitman, 1994). Greenlee and 
Raskovich (2006) present the analysis of Partial Vertical Ownership (PVO) in vertically 
related industries. In their article, the PVO is backward (i.e. upward) and makes no change to 
production in the case of symmetric costs. The choice of forward (i.e. downward) PVO in our 
article is crucial for studying the effects of vertical affiliation following vertical separation 
and a subsequent competition opening. In this case, we allow the supplier to acquire an equity 
interest in one of dealers, corresponding to an affiliation. Affiliates are partially owned by 
parent companies while subsidiaries are majority owned (Slovin and Sushka, 1998). With this 
set-up we study different effects from those of a complete reintegration (see e.g. Cyrenne, 
1993; Hunold and Stahl, 2016).  
Vertical integration analysis recognises the benefits of aligned interests (Williamson, 1971) 
for firms. Moreover, vertical integration does not serve to reduce competition and may 
instead intensify it (Spengler, 1950). Unlike the "outsider effect" of horizontal mergers 
(Salant et al, 1983), in vertically related industries the gains of concluding a vertical 
arrangement (partial or full) outweigh the benefits of staying outside. In this article, we verify 
the incentives of a monopoly to affiliate a downstream retailer via PVO and confirm the 
profitability of this vertical agreement. 
However, the change in government economic policy towards greater market liberalisation 
has led to the privatisation and the vertical separation of historic public network companies 
(railways, telecommunications, energy, water, television channels). Regulatory milestones, 
including the 1974 DOJ decision against AT&T and the 1998 European Commission 
directive on public telecom networks, opened competition to new entrants and forced the 
reorganisation of former monopolies (Mayer-Schonberger and Strasser, 1998; Waldfogel and 
Wulf, 2006). 
Because of the opening to competition, suppliers and dealers of integrated network had to 
separate their upstream and downstream activities on the network. In 16 European countries, 
the positive effects of vertical separation (combined with new entries) on efficiency and 
productivity have been empirically demonstrated in the rail industry (Cantos et al., 2010). 
However, anti-competitive behaviour persists with discriminatory incentives in the US 
telephone industry after separation (Weisman, 1995). Outside regulated industries, in retail 
gasoline markets, vertical separation itself has anti-competitive effects such as output 
reduction, increases profits and welfare losses (Slade, 1998). 
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In contrast to horizontal separation, vertical separation can harm competition because the 
induced double margin increases the final price for the consumer. Vertical integration is then 
replaced by vertical contract arrangements (franchise fees, two-part tariffs) between upstream 
suppliers and downstream dealers (see e.g. Bonanno and Vickers, 1998; Ziss, 1995) leading 
to increased collusion detrimental to economic welfare. This article investigates the 
effectiveness of affiliations in vertically separated network industries to encourage monopoly 
investment and to reduce Cournot's collusion at the downstream level. 
The novelty of our article is the presentation in a model of a two-level network industry with 
an upstream monopoly and a downstream Cournot oligopoly where a vertical forward 
affiliation is preferred to a subsidiarisation or a full integration. Examples of natural upstream 
monopolies are common in network industries, they include electricity (Lim and Yurukoglu, 
2018) and gas distribution, telecommunications, or rail network management companies. In 
the US telecommunications sector, the separation of the monopoly from downstream retailers 
and the link with affiliates is of regulatory importance to the Federal Trade Commission 
(Reiffen, 1998). In addition, electricity and gas transmission holding companies with power 
generation are regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, so they follow a 
strict code of conduct. Therefore, this study provides regulators with new information on the 
impact of affiliation in vertically related network industries. 
Our paper, using this vertically related model, contributes to this part of the literature mainly 
as regards as the following aspects: 
• The incentives to affiliate via PVO. In line with the real-world complexity of minority 
shareholding, this work complements existing literature on vertical integration in the 
context of network industries. 
• The supplier’s decision to invest in the network with or without PVO. As a network 
supplier, the upstream monopoly makes the investment decision on the network, which 
has an impact on its maintenance cost. Traditional and empirical results on monopoly 
pricing establish a problem of underinvestment (Knight, 1930; Blum et al., 2007). Our 
general results (without the need of asymmetric costs) for linear demand and Cournot 
setting (relevant to network industries, see e.g. Eichengreen et al., 2016; Katz and 
Shapiro, 1985) demonstrate the incentive effect of PVO affiliation on monopoly's 
investment relative to a benchmark. 
• The impact of affiliation on Cournot competition at the retailers’ level. The supplier’s 
internalisation of the affiliate profit leads to double margin reduction which in turn 
improves downstream Cournot competition and consumer surplus. 
• The impact of affiliation on the double margin and deadweight loss of the monopoly 
which, combined with increased competition, improves the economic welfare. 
 
The result and the structure of our model appear consistent with empirical findings of vertical 
economies generated by partially integrated holding companies in the U.S. electric power 
industry (Kwoka, 2002).  
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section II reviews the relevant literature on 
partial ownership. Section III outlines the model used applying weak restrictions on demand 
4 
 
and competition's conjectures. Section IV highlights the key analytical results obtained after 
the study of the effects of PVO affiliation versus separation using a comparative static 
analysis. Section V concludes and discusses the opportunities for further work. 
 
II Literature review  
 
Large companies have complex group structure which can include a principal and 
intermediate holdings, affiliates, subsidiaries and associate companies. The link between the 
different entities constituting of the group is realised with full or partial equity ownership. 
This participation networks of companies have been much studied in the literature. Cases 
include horizontal and vertical PO in the Cable TV industry in the US (Besen et al., 1999) 
and “Keiretsu” in Japan (Brown and Fung, 2009). The Keiretsu in Japan have been widely 
discussed for the implications of their complex equity and debt ownerships (Berglof and 
Perotti, 1994; Flath, 1993) on cooperation and mutual monitoring of managers practices. 
Furthermore, during the “golden shares” era in the 1980’s, European governments 
implemented the use of cross horizontal participations to protect strategic companies
2
 from 
foreign takeovers (Serbera and Fry, 2018). “Deutschland AG” in Germany (Lantenois, 20110 
and “noyaux-durs” in France (Goldstein, 1996) complete their use in Europe outside of the 
United Kingdom (Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998). Due to their relative intricacy, modelling of 
these shareholding interlocks has been studied in mixed framework including both vertical 
and horizontal PO (e.g. Greenlee and Raskovich, 2000; Serbera, 2011). 
Simpler ownership structures are more common, they include partial integration in a 
manufacturer-retailer vertical relation or at the horizontal level, both can be reciprocal or 
unilateral. The impact of these PO on competition and market structure is substantial (see 
Allen and Philipps, 2000; Reitman, 1994). Reynolds and Snapp (1986) show that PO reduces 
output and increases prices in a Cournot model with barriers to entry. Even when the amount 
of PO is small, this result has anticompetitive effects similar to those of mergers (O’Brien and 
Salop, 1999). 
Gilo et al. (2006) consider the case of cross participations in a dynamic Bertrand model and 
conclude that tacit collusion can be sustained in the long run. Cross holdings also increase 
collusion by incentivising competing firms to reciprocally reveal their costs leading to 
relaxed competition (Liu et al., 2018).  In addition, Li et al. (2015) study the entry deterrence 
effect of cross partial holdings for a monopoly incumbent, leading to a no entry in exchange 
for redistribution of the monopoly profit. 
In the case of vertically-related industries, Fiocco (2016) studies partial vertical ownership in 
successive duopolies with secret retailer costs leading to price increase and competition 
relaxation. Wadeson (2017) considers the incentives for an upstream supplier to fully 
integrate one of its price-taker dealers, however partial integration is not allowed. Our article 
complements the existing literature by modelling a monopoly manufacturer supplying an 
access to network to downstream retailers competing à la Cournot. The monopoly affiliates 
                                                 
2
 Private companies with significant public interests such as military, nuclear energy and financial companies. 
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one of the downstream retailers by acquiring equity shares allowing us to study the impact of 
forward partial integration on investment in the network, competition and deadweight loss of 
the monopoly. The current study presents positive incentives to partial integration with 
forward PO in complement to the results of Hunold and Stahl (2016) in the case of backward 
partial integration.  
This issue of ownership structure change applies after the privatization of historically public 
network companies (railway, energy, telecoms) and the regulatory requirements to open the 
market to new competition (see e.g. Amundsen and Bergman, 2002; Lee and Hwang, 2003). 
Using the illustrative case of the US and Japanese automobile industries Alley (1997) derives 
empirical results confirming the collusive effects of PO. In contrast, Malueg (1992) finds that 
in a dynamic Cournot framework, repeated interactions between competitors lead to a more 
competitive equilibrium. 
In the US telecom industry, Reiffen (1998) re-examines the results of Weisman (1995) on 
discriminatory incentives of the monopoly using price access in a similarly structured 
downstream duopoly. Results are that, contrary to Weisman (1995), vertical PO align both 
firms’ interests and lead to a potentially anti-competitive foreclosure. Our article extends the 
study of the competitive role of PO in network industries by introducing vertical affiliation in 
a downstream oligopoly and leads to modified results on competition and investment 
incentives. These results appear in line with empirical findings of Kwoka (2002) studying 
network economies following the adoption of partial holding structure in the US electric 
sector. 
Finally, our study contributes to the issue of cost reducing technologies in industries using 
distribution networks, such as ethylene and propylene or oil (see Van Triest and Vis, 2007). 
In exchange for investment, Bester and Petrakis (1993) studied the incentives for firms to 
adopt cost-reduction technology and discussed the possibility of reaching different equilibria 
(symmetric or asymmetric) in a Cournot duopoly; depending on the type of equilibrium 
consumer surplus can be enhanced. Subsequently, Barcena-Ruiz and Olaizola (2006) 
introduced to the previous model a strategic delegation from the owner to the manager in 
both a Bertrand and Cournot framework. Kesavayuth et al. (2018) examine the impact of full 
integration on investment. We build on these previous works by introducing inter-company 
affiliation to study the use of PVO as an incentive to invest in reducing cost in the network. 
In the following section, we present the Cournot model for a vertically related industry used 
to determine how a vertical affiliation affects network investment incentives, competition and 
welfare impact of the monopoly. 
 
III The model: Affiliation in a supplier-dealers industry with Partial Vertical 
Ownership 
 
Our analysis presents a supplier-dealers two-level industry with the network supplying firm 
in a situation of monopoly at the upstream level and the downstream dealers in Cournot 
competition. Table 1 presents detailed notations of the Cournot-Nash model. 
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The network supplier, noted U, sells the network's access to the downstream dealing firms in 
exchange for a fee , the network's maintenance cost is noted . We focus on cases in which 
, as a two-part tariff ( ) will offset the effects of the PVO on the double margin. 
The maintenance cost is assumed to take two possible values conditionals to the level of 
investment in the network,  for low and high level of investment respectively. The 
cost of investment I is amortized by the upstream monopoly when the difference in profit 
following the cost-reduction is greater
3
 than the investment. The investment as a fixed one-
off cost does not impact maximization choices and thus can be normalized to 0 to simplify 
the notations without loss of generality. 
At the downstream level, we use a traditional setting of Cournot oligopoly (in networks 
industry: telecom, railways, energy) with homogenous goods
4
 that has  dealing firms 
ℕ (Tirole, 1988). Assuming a quadratic utility function of consuming   
of firm i's product and paying the price  with the homogeneous substitutability parameter 
set equal to 1, we derive that the inverse demand function for an individual firm is 𝑝𝑖 = 𝐴 −
∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑖  and we note . Whilst an obvious simplification, the homogeneous 
substitutability condition and linear demand seems to have empirical relevance to 
applications to the network industries (see e.g. Eichengreen et al., 2016; Katz and Shapiro, 
1985). Set up in this way this model arises as an important special case of the classical model 
in Greenlee and Raskovich (2006). 
 
Definition 1. An affiliation is a financial transaction in which one upstream supplier acquires 
an equity participation (a PVO) in the capital of one of its downstream dealers. 
(i) Partial ownership are silent participations (Reitman, 1994; Flath, 1989), giving the 
acquirer no right in the other firm management decisions. 
(ii) The cost of acquisition paid by the supplier U, a transfer price 𝑡𝑈𝑖 with 𝑖 ∈  𝐷, is assumed 
to be a flat payment and normalized
5
 to 0. 
 
Let denote the capital of firm  held by the supplier . The affiliation involves 
the acquisition of  by the upstream supplier. Figure 1 illustrates the organisation of our 
two-level industry with forward PVO. 
 
                                                 
3  In the model's notation:  
4
 The introduction of differentiation in the demand function has no impact on the results in the Cournot model 
and should be used to generalise the model to other forms of competition such as Bertrand.  
5
 The transfer price is thus independent of produced quantities and offsets at the industry profits' level. We 
discuss in Section IV the cost of acquisition of capital. Small capital acquisitions such as the silent PVO do not 
include the transfer of control between major shareholders. However, in the case of majority ownership, a 
premium would have to be paid in addition to the share market price to obtain the transfer of control. 
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[Insert Figure 1 near here] 
 
Two firms U and say  are in partial vertical ownership agreement if . We write 
. The special case  represents a benchmark case of vertical separation. The 
decision of an affiliation
6
 allows the affiliate to keep control over its decision while rebating 
profits to the parent company.  
Profit for the downstream affiliated dealer  is given by . 
Operating profit for the non-affiliated dealers and representative of most of the industry is 
denoted by . Supplier 's operating profit is generated from charging 
network's access to the downstream dealers, total profit including downward participation in 
 notes: . 
 
[Insert Table I near here] 
 
The industry is comprised of two levels and profits are maximized at each level starting with 
the network's price setting by the monopoly. We solve backward in a two-stage resolution. 
 
 Downstream. The  downstream dealers and the single affiliate choose to 






Simplifying for the symmetric equilibrium we obtain first-stage quantities noted with a : 
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 After a vertical separation an affiliation with PVO could be granted whereas a subsidiarisation may be blocked 
by the regulator.  
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  (2) 
Aggregating over the n downstream firms we obtain final demand noted  and can 
derive the final good's price : 
 
 





       (4) 
 
 Upstream. The supplier in monopoly 
Using a one-to-one technology each unit of the final good requires one unit of intermediate 
good, hence the upstream total quantity must equate the total quantity on the downstream 
market: 𝐷(𝑟) = 𝐷(𝑝) = 𝑄. 
Replacing expressions (1), (2) and (3) in the profit expression of the upstream supplier  




















































At the final good level, the consumer surplus notes . 
 
IV Analytic results 
 
In this section we establish the results of vertical partial ownership on both industry's levels. 
From expression (5) we derive equilibrium values of the model summarised in table 2. 
 
[Insert Table II near here] 
 
IV (i) Incentives for the acquisition of PVO 
 
Using Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly models, Inderst and Wey (2004) compute the expected 
gains of a merger to derive acquiring firms’ incentives. In the context of our model of an 
asymmetric vertical industry with downstream Cournot competition, we start computing the 
monopoly’s incentives to acquire PVO and solve for optimal quantities of PVO (β1). In 
addition, we discuss the solution obtained in terms of acquisition cost. Then, we determine 
the incentives to invest in the network by computing the expected gains of the cost-reduction 
following this investment: 𝑐  → 𝑐. 
 
The difference between the profit of the monopoly with PVO and the benchmark profit allow 







4(𝑛2 + 𝑛 − 𝛽1)(𝑛 + 1)
 . 








For 𝛽1 ∈ [0,0.5) we observe that 𝑉𝛽 > 0 hence the incentive for the monopoly to acquire 
PVO. We then calculate the optimal quantities of acquired PVO using the ratio of profits with 







𝑛2 + 𝑛 − 𝛽1
.  
        (7) 
Equation (7) is greater than 1 for any value of 𝛽1 > 0. This result confirms the positive 
incentives of the monopoly to invest in the downstream dealer leading to proposition 1: 
 
Proposition 1. In a two-level Cournot industry the incentives for an acquisition of a forward 
PVO between an upstream supplier and a downstream dealer (an affiliation) are positive for 
any positive value of . 
 
This result is important because it justifies the acquisition of minority interest below the 
regulatory threshold of 5%, which leads to a higher investment by the supplier without the 
need for regulatory approval. 
 
We assume here that the acquisition cost is normalised to 0. This assumption holds for a 
single period-model if the value of the acquired share is equal to (or lower than) the 
proportional claim on the profit’s rebate. In this case, which is appropriate for our study of 
minority shareholdings and toeholds (see e.g. Bris, 2002; Reitman, 1994), there is no interior 
solution for optimal PVO amounts. In the case of a larger integration or a complete 
acquisition following a toehold, the endogenisation of PVO interior solutions could be 
achieved by introducing a non-linear acquisition cost adding a control premium to encourage 
shareholders to waive their claim on profit and decision-making power. 
 





It is expected that cost-reduction will subsequently increase
7
 the PVO and benchmark 
equilibrium profits and surplus. To characterise the incentivising effects of PVO we compare 
-by subtracting- the expected gains of cost-reduction between the PVO equilibrium quantities 
and the benchmark equilibrium quantities. 
We note  the upstream monopoly's incentives to investment in the network: 
 
. 
            (8) 
 
For  we observe that  as it is commonly assumed that the demand 
parameter exceeds the cost: , hence  This result confirms the positive 
incentives of PVO on the monopoly’s investment decision.  
Furthermore, to confirm the impact of PVO on incentives to invest in cost reduction for the 








(𝑐 − 𝑐)(2𝐴 − 𝑐 − 𝑐)𝑛2
4(𝛽1 − 𝑛2 −  𝑛)2
 . 
             (9) 
 
Similarly, for  we observe that (9) is positive i.e. that investment incentives 
increase with PVO. Intuitively, the result of equation (9) supports the evidence that the PVO 
has a positive role in the investment decisions of a monopoly supplier. 
The impact of cost reduction on investment incentives is particularly important for the 
upstream monopoly that makes the investment decision. Equation (9) is therefore adequate
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to characterise the investment incentives in the industry. 
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This study allows us to derive incentives to invest in the network from the upstream supplier. 
The economic interpretation of equations (6)-(9) is a comparison between the PVO 
arrangement and the benchmark; it allows us to model an affiliation versus a full separation. 
Specifically, equations (8) and (9) allow us to obtain Proposition 2. It shows that in a two-
level industry with PVO the incentives for investment in the network are increased relative to 
a benchmark. 
 
Proposition 2. In a two-level Cournot industry with a forward PVO between an upstream 
supplier and a downstream dealer (an affiliation) the incentives for an investment in the 
network are greater than in a benchmark industry. 
 
Affiliation therefore appears more economically efficient to promote investment in a network 
managed by an upstream supplier because positive incentives to reduce the cost will 
subsequently increase profits and surplus compared to a high-cost setup. 
 
IV (iii) Comparative static 
 
After discussing the impact of cost reduction in the previous subsection, we consider any 
value of the cost parameter c to characterise the impact of PVO on the social welfare at the 
economy’s level. We thus study the influence of  on industry profits and consumer 
surplus.  
We start by calculating the variation in the profit balance - following the exchange of the 
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Equation (10) is positive for  and , the PVO thus increases the sum of the 
profits of the two firms involved in the affiliation. This specifically demonstrates the positive 
role of PVO on profit for the two firms engaged in the affiliation. 
 
The following is the calculation of the variation of profits of the other downstream firm and 





















Equation (11) and (12) are positive for  and , therefore, the PVO increases 
downstream profits and consumer surplus, characterising the positive incentives of PVO.  
 
The incentives calculated in equations (10)-(12) are positive at all the levels of the considered 
industry: profits and consumer surplus. Therefore, the sum of these incentives is positive as 
well, leading to an increased social welfare with PVO in comparison to a benchmark without 
PVO.  
We summarise this result in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3. In a two-level Cournot industry the acquisition of a forward PVO between an 
upstream supplier and a downstream dealer (the affiliation) increases the social welfare. 
 5.0,01  2n




IV (iv)  Affiliation to reduce the deadweight loss of the monopoly  
 
Traditionally, an industry with a monopolistic structure (at one or more levels) is expected to 
find equilibrium in a sub-optimal Pareto situation because of the deadweight loss of 
monopoly that reduces social welfare (Harberger, 1954). In our industry, we have shown that 
PVO through affiliation increases the welfare. This is due to a reduction in the deadweight 
loss of the upstream monopoly. By internalising part of the profit of its downstream affiliate 
with PVO, the monopoly is incentivised to reduce its network's charge . In turn the 
downstream dealers react by increasing the second margin  along with the final output 
quantities  to boost their profits. The increased profits are then recaptured by the 
monopoly, this strategic reduction of the double margin improves the economic efficiency of 
the industry. The following proposition summarises the effect of reducing double 
marginalisation on the deadweight loss of the monopoly: 
 
Proposition 4. In a two-level Cournot industry the acquisition of a forward PVO between an 
upstream supplier and a downstream dealer reduces the deadweight loss of the monopoly 
following an increase in output and a decrease in the final price due to a strategic reduction 




The impact of the PVO on the increase in final output  coupled to a reduction of the final 





































This article explores the theoretical study of the impact of forward PVO in the context of 
affiliation in a two-level industry. A mixture of theoretical work (see e.g. Flath, 1989; 
Greenlee and Raskovich, 2006) and applied work (see Cantos et al., 2010) examines vertical 
participations but does not explicitly link them to affiliations. Our contribution is also timely 
and relevant. In the case of vertically-related industries Jullien and Rey (2007) study the 
impact of the resale price maintenance contract on collusion. Vertical contract models are 
empirically tested by Bonnet and Dubois (2010). More specifically, numerous articles 
highlight the role and functioning of the different forms of vertical integration for backward 
PVO (Greenlee and Raskovich, 2006), and for full integration (Grossman and Hart, 1986). 
However, studies of the effects of partial or foreclosing integration do not allow for affiliation 
(Schrader and Martin, 1998; Serbera, 2011). 
In this paper, we study the incentives for affiliation versus separation in a vertically related 
industry with an upstream network provider and a downstream Cournot oligopoly. The use of 
the PVO reduces the market power of the monopoly on pricing and investment decision by 
providing increased incentives to invest compared to a benchmark. Double marginalisation is 
reduced, leading to increased output quantities. This reduces the deadweight loss of the 
monopoly and improves the consumer and social welfare. The implications for competition 
policy are compelling. 
This competitive aspect is highlighted by a comparison of investment incentives between an 
affiliated industry (PVO) and a fully separated industry (benchmark), our model confirming 
empirical results of Kwoka (2002). It would be imprudent to use the theoretical results of our 
model to amend existing anti-trust policies (see e.g. Sweeting, 2007). However, allowing 
minority shareholdings below the minimal threshold of 5% after separation could be socially 
beneficial without alarming regulators. 
This article sheds new light on the analysis of privatisation of public network industries’ 
policy. The choice by policy makers between full separation and partial affiliation has 
consequences for competition, market power and social welfare. Future work will examine 
the consequences of multiple PVO forward arrangements. A combination of PHO and PVO 
could provide interior solutions for optimal values of partial ownership. This could be 
decisive in analysing the influence of partial ownership on market concentration and 
economic welfare. Other types of demand functions with non-homogeneous goods could 
 5.0,01  2n
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extend the model to other settings e.g. Bertrand competition. Other studies of equity 
strategies, which allow for the control of decisions, may have important implications both for 
policy makers responsible for the current regulatory oversight process and for the 
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For  and we observe that . 




Similarly, it is straightforward to obtain that for  and . 









































































Again, we observe that  for  and . 
 
0sV  5.0,01  2n
